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1 
ARGUMENT 
 
Reasonable Suspicion That Noeller’s Car Violated Idaho’s Window Tinting 
Statute Justified The Stop 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court erred when it concluded that police lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop Noeller’s car for a suspected violation of I.C. § 49-944, Idaho’s 
window tinting statute, because her car had Arizona license plates.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 4-7.)  Noeller contends the district court did not err for four reasons:  
First, “while an out-of-state-driver’s conduct is certainly subject to regulation 
under Idaho law, a vehicle’s equipment, such as license plates or window tinting, 
which are [sic] legal in other states, cannot be regulated by Idaho law.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)  This argument fails because it is unsupported by 
any law.  (Id.)    Second, Noeller argues that in relation to cars licensed in other 
jurisdictions, officers must employ a “presumption of validity as to its equipment.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)  This argument fails because the legal authority 
cited does not support creation of such a presumption.  Third, Noeller contends 
that the terms “[n]o person” and “any motor vehicle” as used in I.C. § 49-944 are 
ambiguous because they do not apply to persons and vehicles outside of Idaho’s 
jurisdiction and therefore the phrases must be interpreted to exclude vehicles not 
registered in Idaho.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-13.)  This argument is a non 
sequitur that invites the Court to ignore the plain language of the statute.  Fourth, 
Noeller argues the legislature did “not intend that out-of-state citizens … should 
be responsible for checking all Idaho vehicle equipment laws and making 
modifications … to their vehicles before taking a vacation or driving through 
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Idaho.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)  Again, there is no exception in the statute for 
cars registered in other states.  Noeller’s arguments that the district court 
correctly concluded that Noeller was exempt from complying with Idaho law, and 
therefore the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of a violation of Idaho law, lack 
merit. 
 Noeller next argues, in the alternative, that the police unconstitutionally 
extended the stop (and that this tainted Noeller’s consent).  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 14-20.)  While this issue was raised to the district court (R., pp. 54-55), the 
district court specifically declined to address it (R., p. 123).  This Court must 
reject Noeller’s invitation to make factual findings (the state strongly disputes the 
“facts” as argued by Noeller but not found by the district court).  At best Noeller is 
entitled to remand to address this issue. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The relevant standards of review applicable to statutory construction and 
suppression of evidence are found in the Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.  
 
C. Cars Licensed Out-Of-State Are Not Exempt From Idaho Equipment Laws 
 
 Noeller’s four arguments fall into two categories: That the State of Idaho 
cannot require cars licensed outside the state to comply with equipment laws 
when inside the state (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11) and that I.C. § 49-944 should 
be interpreted to not apply to vehicles registered outside the state (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 11-14).  Neither of these propositions has merit. 
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1. Application Of I.C. § 49-944 To Noeller Did Not Violate Her Right 
To Travel 
 
 “The United States Supreme Court has long held that the federal 
constitution guarantees a fundamental right to travel from one state to another.”  
State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 518, 129 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(citations omitted).  “The right to travel contains three primary guarantees.”  
Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 461, 197 P.3d 310, 322 (2008).  Those 
guarantees are:  (1) “the right of a citizen from one state to travel to another 
state”; (2) “the right to be treated equal to citizens of another state upon taking 
up residence in that state”; and (3) “the right of travelers temporarily in a state to 
be regarded as welcome visitors.”  Id. (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 
(1999)).  “A state law does not impermissibly infringe on th[e] right [to travel] 
unless impeding travel is the law’s primary objection, the law actually deters such 
travel, or the law uses a classification that serves to penalize the exercise of the 
right.”  State v. Wilder, 138 Idaho 644, 646, 67 P.3d 839, 841 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(citing Att’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986)).  Nothing 
in the right to travel, as articulated by the courts above, requires the State of 
Idaho to exempt vehicles licensed out-of-state from its generally applicable 
vehicle maintenance and equipment safety laws. 
 Noeller contends Idaho’s window-tinting law will discourage those with 
non-compliant vehicles from travelling in Idaho.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 9-11, 
14.)  Discouraging people from violating Idaho law is hardly a violation of the 
right to travel.  No doubt citizens of Washington and Oregon are discouraged 
from bringing pot and paraphernalia into Idaho by its more restrictive marijuana 
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laws, but such does not render those laws unconstitutional. Likewise, other 
states’ more restrictive gun laws might deter Idahoans from bringing firearms 
with larger magazines or other features prohibited by law into those states, but 
again, that alone does not render those statutes unconstitutional.  There is 
simply no legal basis for Noeller’s claim that Idaho must exempt items that are 
legally possessed or used in other states from its laws prohibiting the possession 
or use of items in the State of Idaho.  That Idaho’s law regarding the operation of 
cars with overly tinted windows is more restrictive than Arizona’s does not render 
that law unconstitutional in whole or in part.  
 Noeller also contends the district court’s reliance on State v. Morgan, 154 
Idaho 109, 112, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013), was proper.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 13.)  The holding of that case, however, was limited to the code section there 
at issue: “Idaho Code § 49–428 requires that a vehicle registered in Idaho 
display both front and rear license plates. This requirement does not extend to 
vehicles registered in other states.”  Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124 
(emphasis added).  By holding that the requirement of a specific statute 
(I.C. § 49-428) applied only to cars registered in Idaho the Court merely 
interpreted the relevant statute.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)  The Court did not 
purport to be announcing a general rule or principle of law that Idaho motor 
vehicle laws apply only to Idaho-registered vehicles. 
 Noeller contends there is a presumption that an out-of-state car is 
properly equipped.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 9-11.)  She cites two cases, but 
review of those cases shows no support for her proposed legal standard.  In 
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State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 348, 160 P.3d 1279, 1283 (Ct. App. 2001), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals stated that law enforcement officers may not “presume 
that temporary permits are invalid per se, justifying an officer to stop a vehicle in 
order to conduct further inspection concerning the legitimacy of the temporary 
permit.”  In State v. Case, 159 Idaho 546, 551–52, 363 P.3d 868, 873–74 
(Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals held “that a properly displayed dealer plate 
carries with it a presumption of validity and cannot serve as the sole basis for 
reasonable suspicion to allow an officer to stop a vehicle.”  The Court of Appeals 
said nothing in either case justifying a claim that drivers of cars with equipment 
violations visible to an officer, whether registered in-state or out, must be 
presumed to be obeying the law. 
 Noeller has failed to show that she was exempt from the application of 
Idaho motor vehicle equipment laws because the car she was driving was 
licensed in Arizona. 
2. By Its Plain Language I.C. § 49-944 Applies To “Any Motor Vehicle” 
 
 As set forth in more detail in the state’s initial brief (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 6-7), I.C. § 49-944(2) makes it an infraction to operate “any vehicle … on the 
public highways” if it has “a windshield or windows which are not in compliance 
with the provisions of this section.”  There is no dispute that Noeller was driving a 
vehicle, on a public highway, that the officer had reason to suspect was not in 
compliance with the provisions of section 49-944(2). 
 Noeller argues that by “any vehicle” the legislature meant “any vehicle 
registered in Idaho,” as follows: 
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I.C. § 49-944(1) states that it is “unlawful for any person to . . . 
apply window tinting film . . . to the windows of any motor vehicle” 
that does not meet the Idaho specifications. Despite this seemingly 
broad language, section 1 clearly cannot control the citizens of 
other states, or the window tinting they may lawfully apply to their 
vehicles. Indeed, it is not unlawful for any person in the country to 
apply darker window tinting than is allowed under Idaho law, only 
any person in Idaho. A resident of Alaska, for example, would not 
fall under the scope of section 1 and be required to follow its 
requirements when applying window tinting to his car that is 
registered in his home state. As such, the implicit definitions of “any 
person” and “any motor vehicle,” as used in section 1, are “any 
person in Idaho,” and “any motor vehicle registered in Idaho.” 
 
(Respondent’s brief, p. 13 (emphasis and ellipses original).)  The state readily 
concedes most of this argument.  The legislature probably did recognize the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state and did not intend to criminalize any act of 
window tinting or driving with overly tinted windows occurring in other states, 
including but not limited to Alaska and Arizona.  What this has to do with where 
the car is registered, however, is a complete mystery.  Eliminate the word 
“registered” and the state agrees that “‘any person’” and “‘any motor vehicle,’” as 
used in section 1, are “any person in Idaho,” and “any motor vehicle registered in 
Idaho” because Idaho’s territorial jurisdiction would limit application of the statute 
to the State of Idaho.  The insertion of the word “registered,” however, is a 
complete non sequitur.  That the statute applies to operation of “any vehicle” 
within the State of Idaho (because it legally cannot apply to operation of vehicles 
outside the State of Idaho) does not suggest, implicitly or otherwise, that a 
vehicle falls within the scope of the statute only if it is “registered in Idaho.” 
 The language of I.C. § 49-944(2) is plain.  It applies to “any vehicle” being 
“operat[ed] on the public highways” with “a windshield or windows which are not 
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in compliance with the provisions of this section.”  Because the police had 
reasonable suspicion that Noeller was operating a vehicle with windows not in 
compliance with the section on a public highway in Idaho, they had reasonable 
suspicion justifying the traffic stop in question.  The district court erred by holding 
otherwise. 
 
D. Noeller’s Invitation To Make Factual Findings On Appeal Must Be 
Rejected 
 
 An appellate court is “bound to consider only the record and cannot find 
facts.”  In re City of Shelley, 151 Idaho 289, 294, 255 P.3d 1175, 1180 (2011).  
“It is not the function of [an appellate] Court to make findings of fact.”  Walter v. 
Potlatch Forests, Inc., 94 Idaho 738, 740, 497 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1972) (citing 
Sparkman v. Miller-Cahoon Co., 48 Idaho 254, 282 P. 273, 276 (1929)).  When 
the factual findings by the trial court are inadequate, the proper remedy is 
ordinarily to remand for further factual findings and conclusions of law.  Id. 
 The district court specifically declined to address issues other than the 
appropriateness of the traffic stop.  (R., p. 123 (“Although other issues could be 
addressed as to the appropriateness of further investigation, length of the stop, 
reasonable suspicion, etc., the Court need not address those issues because of 
the decision made herein.”)  Despite the lack of relevant factual findings or 
analysis by the district court, Noeller invites this Court to conclude her stop was 
unlawfully prolonged and her consent thereby rendered involuntary.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp 14-20.)  This invitation must be rejected for lack of 
relevant factual findings. 
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On appeal Noeller contends that Trooper Peeples’ explanation for why he 
did not immediately employ his tint meter is not credible, and “he was only 
interested in fishing to find some evidence of a crime, no matter how long it 
took.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 16.)  The district court, however, found only that 
Trooper Peebles testified that he abandoned the initial reason for the stop to 
investigate drug crimes based on a belief officers “had reasonable suspicion [of] 
additional criminal activity involving the vehicle or the individuals.”  (R., pp. 118-
19.)  It made no credibility determination as to Trooper Peeples’ testimony.  This 
Court must decline Noeller’s invitation to find that Trooper Peeples testified 
falsely.    
Although issues concerning whether extension of the stop was justified by 
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity will likely have to be 
addressed, because they require factual findings they must be addressed by the 
district court, not for the first time on appeal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order of suppression, vacate its order dismissing, and remand for further 
proceedings.  
 DATED this 16th day of August, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of August, 2016, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT by 
emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
 REED P. ANDERSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
